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Abstract 
Several recent studies have shown that, when fiscal and monetary authorities play a Stackelberg game, central bank 
opacity has a fiscal disciplining effect in the sense that it induces the government to reduce taxes and public 
expenditures, leading hence to lower inflation and output distortions, and in general a lower macroeconomic variability. 
We show in this paper that, in a Nash equilibrium, the government is still disciplined by central bank opacity. 
However, the disciplining effect on the level and variability of inflation and the output gap is more likely dominated by 
the direct effect of opacity.
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1.  Introduction 
 
Central bank transparency is usually studied in a game framework focusing on the 
interactions between the monetary authority and the private sector.
1  Departing from this 
approach, several studies introduce monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Assuming that the 
government plays against the central bank as a Stackelberg leader, Ciccarone et al. (2007), and 
Hefeker and Zimmer (2011) have shown that uncertainty (or opacity) about the central bank’s 
“political” preference parameter could have a fiscal disciplining effect, inducing lower taxes and 
hence lower inflation and output distortions. It could also reduce the macroeconomic volatility if 
the initial degree of opacity is sufficiently high. In a framework where productivity-enhancing 
public  investment could improve future growth potential, Dai and Sidiropoulos (2011) have 
reexamined the issue of central bank transparency in the Stackelberg equilibrium. They have 
shown that, when the public investment is highly productivity enhancing, the optimal choice of 
tax rate and public investment eliminates the effects of distortionary taxation and fully 
counterbalances  both the direct and fiscal-disciplining effects of opacity, on the level and 
variability of inflation and the output gap. By considering the above sequential timing, these 
authors  agree with the view that the Stackelberg equilibrium concept is the  one that better 
captures fiscal and monetary policy interactions (Beetsma and Bovenberg 1998, and Beetsma and 
Uhlig 1999). 
However, important monetary and fiscal policy decisions could also occur simultaneously. 
For instance, one could notice that during severe recessions and/or financial crises – such as the 
current one –  the timing of monetary and fiscal policies may well diverge from that of a 
Stackelberg game between monetary and fiscal authorities. Under these circumstances, it may be 
reasonable to assume that monetary and fiscal policies are chosen at the same moment. This 
explains why many authors have considered the implications of non-coordinated monetary and 
fiscal policy interactions in a Nash game (e.g.,  Alesina and Tabellini 1987,  Beetsma and 
Bovenberg 1997, Dixit and Lambertini 2003, Di Bartolomeo et al. 2009, and Di Bartolomeo and 
Giuli 2011). 
Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2003) have considered the implications of central bank 
transparency in a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities, both concerned with taxes. 
The fiscal disciplining effect is somewhat present in their model but is not highlighted by the 
authors. Moreover, in opposite to the above  studies  on  the fiscal disciplining effect in the 
Stackelberg equilibrium,  they  consider that uncertainty is only associated with the weight 
attached to the output gap. This might induce arbitrary economic effects of central bank 
preference uncertainty (Beetsma and Jensen 2003) because a small change in the uncertainty 
specification (i.e., putting the stochastic parameter in the front of one of the two arguments of the 
central bank’s objective function) can lead to radically different effects.  
This paper contributes to the literature on central bank transparency by clarifying the issue of 
fiscal disciplining effect in a Nash equilibrium using a framework similar to Ciccarone et al. 
(2007) and Hefeker and Zimmer (2011), with uncertainty affecting both weights allotted to the 
output and inflation stabilization. The objective of the paper is to show how a change in the game 
structure could affect the importance of fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity.  
                                                 
1 Following the seminal work of Cukierman and Metzler (1986), a large theoretical and empirical literature on 
central bank transparency has been developed. See, e.g., Nolan and Schaling (1998), Faust and Svensson (2001), 
Chortareas et al. (2002), Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), and Demertzis and Hughes Hallet (2007) among others. See 
Geraats (2002), and Eijffinger and van der Cruijsen (2010) for a survey of the literature. 
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The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. 
Section 3 presents the Stackelberg equilibrium. Section 4 examines the effect of opacity in the 
Nash equilibrium. The last section summarizes our findings. 
 
2. The model  
 
We consider a representative competitive firm which chooses labor to maximize profits by taking 
as given the prices (or the inflation rate π ), the wages (and so expected inflation 
e π ) and tax rate 
(τ ) on the firm’s revenue, subject to a production technology. The normalized supply function 
incorporating the effects of distortionary taxes is: 
τ π π − − =
e x ,                 (1) 
where  x  (in log terms) represents the output gap. Equation (1) is a Lucas’s supply function 
extended by Alesina and Tabellini (1987) to take account of distortionary taxes on the output. We 
notice that τ  allows  covering  a  whole  range  of  structural  reforms, such as non-wage costs 
associated with social security (or job protection legislation), the pressures caused by tax or wage 
competition on a regional basis or the more general effects of supply-side deregulation 
(Demertzis et al. 2004). 
The fiscal authority is concerned with the stabilization of inflation and output-gap 
fluctuations around a zero target and the stabilization of public expenditures g  (expressed as a 
percentage of the output) around a targetg . Its loss function is 





1 g g x L
G − + + = δ π δ ,            (2) 
where  E is an operator of mathematical expectations,  1 δ  and  2 δ  the weights assigned to the 
stabilization of inflation and public expenditures respectively. The weight assigned to the output-
gap stabilization is unity. The public expenditures are composed of public sector consumption, 
i.e. public sector wages, current public spending on goods and other government spending. They 
are assumed to yield immediate utility to the government and have no incidence on the output 
supply. The government minimizes (2) subject to the budget constraint excluding seigniorage 
revenue and public debt:
  
τ = g .                   (3) 
Retaining the control of fiscal instruments, the government delegates the conduct of monetary 
policy to the central bank. The latter sets its policy to minimize the loss function 




CB ε π ε µ + + − = ,  0 > µ ,         (4) 
where µ  is the expected relative weight that the central bank assigns to the inflation stabilization 
and it could be different from  1 δ . Larger (small) values of µ  signify that the central bank is 
relatively conservative (liberal or populist) in the sense of Rogoff (1985).  
The central bank does not make full disclosure about the weights assigned to the inflation and 
output-gap stabilization, meaning that ε  is a  stochastic variable for the government and the 
private sector. The distribution of ε   is characterized by  0 ) ( = Ε ε , 
2 2) ( ) var( ε σ ε ε = Ε =   and 
] , 1 [ µ ε − ∈ . A higher variance 
2
ε σ  represents a higher degree of central bank political opacity. 
The case where the central bank is completely predictable and hence completely transparent is 
represented by  0
2 = ε σ . Given that  0 ) ( = Ε ε  and  ] , 1 [ µ ε − ∈ , 
2
ε σ  has an upper bound so that 
] , 0 [
2 µ σε ∈  (Ciccarone et al. 2007). 
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3. The Stackelberg equilibrium  
 
To put into evidence the fiscal disciplining effect in the Nash equilibrium compared with that 
in the Stackelberg equilibrium, we summarize in this section the benchmark model of Hefeker 
and Zimmer (2011).  
The timing of the game is the following. First, the private sector forms inflation expectations, 
e π , then the government sets fiscal policy, τ , and lastly the central bank makes monetary policy 
decision,  π . The private sector, composed of atomistic agents, plays a Nash game against the 
central bank. The government plays against the central bank as a Stackelberg leader. 
The game is solved backwards. The minimization of (4) subject to (1) leads to the central 
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e
.              (5) 
The budget constraint (3) implies that the government has only one free instrument to choose 
between  τ   and g . Assume that the government uses τ   as policy instrument and sets it to 
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Using (1), (3) and (5)-(7), we solve for π ,  x ,  τ ,  g , and the variance of π  and  x  at the 
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S S .    (11) 
The denominator of (8)-(11) increases with 
2
ε σ , the numerator of (8)-(10) is invariant with 
2
ε σ  
while the numerator of (11) increases with 
2
ε σ . Thus, an increase in 
2
ε σ  reduces 
S π , 
S τ  and 
S g , 
leading to higher 
S x  (lower output distortions) since  0 ) ( < − µ ε . In effect, output distortions due 
to taxes destined to finance public expenditures imply higher expected and current inflation, and 
lower output gap. The government perceives that marginal costs associated with higher taxes are 
higher when the central bank is more opaque. Brainard’s (1967) conservatism principle will 
guide the government to adopt a less aggressive fiscal policy (“disciplining effect”). This stance 
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of fiscal policy leads to lower inflation and higher output gap at the cost of larger deviation of 
public expenditures from their target. 
Opacity triggers two opposing effects on macroeconomic volatility. The fiscal disciplining 
effect of opacity, by lowering 
S τ , 
S g  and 
S π  (and increasing 
S x ), implies lower  ) var(
S π  and 
) var(
S x . It acts on the common denominator of (8)-(11). The direct effect of opacity reflects the 
impact of the realization of ε   on inflation and the output gap. The shock ε   enters in the 
numerator of (8)-(9), implying that 
2
ε σ   affects the numerator of (11). The direct and fiscal 
disciplining effects of opacity on macroeconomic variability are respectively defined by the 
derivative of  ) var(
S π  with respect to 
2
ε σ  present in the numerator and the denominator of (11): 
                               
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. 
The fiscal disciplining effect can more than counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on the 






) 1 ( 2
δ
δ µ µ µ δ
ε σ +
+ + + >  and vice versa (Hefeker and Zimmer 2010). The fiscal disciplining effect is 
more likely to induce a decrease in the macroeconomic volatility if the central bank is less averse 
to inflation (i.e., smaller µ ) and the government less concerned with the public expenditures 
deviations (i.e., smaller  2 δ ). In mathematical terms, given the upper bound on 
2
ε σ  (i.e., µ σε <
2 ), 
the previous lower bound on 
2
ε σ   is valid only when  µ δ
µ µ δ δ µ < +
+ + +
) 1 1 (
) 1 ( 2 ) 1
2 ( , implying that 
) 1 (






δ µ µ δ δ
+
+ − + < . If the latter conditions are reversed, the direct effect of opacity will always 
dominate the fiscal disciplining effect (Dai and Sidiropoulos 2011).  
 
4. The Nash equilibrium 
 
The previous findings are based on the Stackelberg game between fiscal and monetary 
authorities. Such a game is justified if the government sets its fiscal policy once at the beginning 
of a period and the central bank makes monetary policy decisions during the period. However, 
important monetary and fiscal policy decisions could also occur simultaneously  as we can 
observe in the current global financial and economic crisis. Allowing the fiscal and monetary 
authorities to move simultaneously in a Nash game, we can examine how a modification in the 
timing of the strategic game could affect the effects of opacity.  
For simplicity, we retain the balanced-budget assumption for the Nash game. We remark 
that, according to Hefeker and Zimmer (2011), the balanced-budget assumption can be justified 
when the scope is a long- to medium-term analysis. However, in a short-term Nash game, this 
assumption can be justified on the ground that the monetary authority is independent of the fiscal 
authority (limiting hence the money financing of the public deficit) and the latter could be limited 
by a fiscal rule or debt ceiling which makes the bond financing of the public deficit unlikely.
2 
                                                 
2 An extension of the model to take account of bond and money financing of the public deficit could be indeed very 
interesting. The presence of public debt and seigniorage revenue could considerably complicate the results by 
introducing the dynamics due to the accumulation of public debt and the interaction between the effects of opacity on 
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The timing of the game is the following. First, the private sector forms 
e π , then 
simultaneously, the government sets τ  and the central bank chooses π . The government and the 
central bank play a Nash game. The game is solved by backward induction. Rational private 
sector will realize that the final outcomes will emerge from a solution combining the optimal 
reaction functions of both fiscal and monetary authorities and the expected inflation rate that 
these reaction functions imply. 
Minimizing (4) subject to (1) leads to the central bank’s reaction function which is the same 
as (5). Taking 
e π  and  π  as given, the government minimizes (2) subject to (1) and (3) and 
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Solving (5) and (12) for π  and τ  in terms of 
e π  and  g  yields 
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Imposing rational expectations by taking mathematical expectations of (13), we obtain: 
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where  ] [ ) 1 (
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Using (1), (3) and (12)-(15) yields the Nash equilibrium solutions denoted by an upper index 
“N”: 
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where the second-order Taylor approximation is used to obtain (19). Deriving (16)-(19) with 
respect to 
2
ε σ  gives
3  
0
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,           
                                                                                                                                                              
seigniorage revenue and fiscal decisions. As a first approach, we want to provide some clear-cut analytical results 
which allow comparing the effects of opacity in Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium. 
3 We can decompose as before the direct and fiscal disciplining effects of opacity on  ) var(
N π  and  ) var(
N x . 
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ε µ σ . 
Higher opacity induces higher 
N π   and lower 
N x   (higher output distortions). It affects 
negatively 
N τ . The fiscal disciplining effect is present in the Nash equilibrium and induces a 
lower 
N τ , while being unable to counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on 
N π  and 
N x .  
Our algebraic results show that, under the second-order Taylor approximation, the variances 
of inflation and the output gap are positively affected by an increase in the degree of opacity 
given that the initial degree of opacity is capped by two upper limits. As long as we admit the 
validity of the second-order Taylor approximation, we can say that, contrary to the Stackelberg 
equilibrium, the fiscal disciplining effect cannot counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on the 
volatility of inflation and the output gap.  
The above findings could be explained by the absence of any commitment made by the 
government in the Nash game. Its non-cooperative behavior will lead the central bank to doubt if 
opacity has any fiscal disciplining effect on the government’s decisions. Thus, the government 
will not have incentive to restrict as less as possible public expenditures and taxes. In other 
words, Brainard’s (1967) conservatism principle which implies that the government is incited to 
adopt a less aggressive fiscal policy in the case of central bank opacity is not likely to play an 
important role in guiding the government’s actions in the Nash equilibrium even though the 
perceived marginal costs associated with higher taxes are higher. Therefore, as the fiscal 
disciplining effect is likely unimportant, the direct effect of opacity will dominate. 
We remark that in the Nash equilibrium, the situation where  µ σε µ δ
δ µ δ µ < < +
+ + 2
) 1 (
)] 1 ( [
2
2
2 2   is 
excluded in order to ensure the coherence of the second-order Taylor approximation with the fact 
that  0 1 2 > Ω − δ , while in the Stackelberg equilibrium, the fiscal disciplining effect can more 
than counterbalance the direct effect of opacity on the variability of inflation and the output gap if 
the initial degree of opacity is such that  µ σε δ
δ µ µ µ δ < < +






2 .   
The fiscal disciplining is dominated by the direct effect of opacity only if the initial degree of 
opacity is sufficiently small, i.e.,  1 ) 1 (
)] 1 ( [ 2
2
2
2 2 Θ ≡ < +
+ +
µ δ
δ µ δ µ
ε σ   in  the Nash equilibrium, and 
2 1




2 Θ ≡ < +
+ + +
δ
δ µ µ µ δ
ε σ  in the Stackelberg equilibrium. After some simple algebra, we find that 
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1 2 2 2
2
2 1 ) ( )] 1 ( [ δ δ δ µ δ µ f + + + = Θ − Θ , where  ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( ][ ) 1 ( [ ) ( 2 2 2 2 µ δ µ µ µ δ µ µ δ δ + − + + + + ≡ f  is 
a convex function. It is straightforwardly to show that  0 ) ( 2 > δ f ,  2
1 > ∀µ .  Therefore, if the 
central bank assigns an average weight sufficiently high to the inflation stabilization, i.e.  2
1 > µ ,  
we have  2 1 Θ > Θ . In this case, it can be said that in the Nash game the fiscal disciplining effect is 
less likely to counterbalance the direct effect given that  µ σε <
2 . For  2
1 < µ , this proposition 
could also be true if the weight assigned by the government to the stabilization of public 
expenditures is either sufficiently low, i.e.  ) 1 ( 2




µ µ δ +
− − − < ,  or sufficiently high, i.e. 
) 1 ( 2




µ µ δ +
− + − > . However, this proposition will be reversed if we simultaneously have 
2
1 < µ ,  [   ; ] ) 1 ( 2
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) 1 ( 2
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− + −
+







δ µ δ µ δ f
+ + − < .  The condition imposed 
on  1 δ  implies that the weight assigned to the inflation stabilization must be sufficiently low given 




In this paper, we have shown that the fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity, which 
can significantly affect the macroeconomic performance and volatility in the framework where 
the government and the central bank act respectively as Stackelberg leader and follower, could 
become insignificant when these two authorities play a Nash game. In the Nash equilibrium, an 
increase in the degree of central bank opacity will always induce a higher inflation, a lower 
output gap and  in general  a higher macroeconomic volatility, despite the existence of  fiscal 
disciplining effect. Given the upper limits on the initial degree of opacity, the fiscal disciplining 
effect is less likely to counterbalance the direct effect on macroeconomic volatility in the Nash 
equilibrium than in  the Stackelberg equilibrium,  except when the central bank and the 
government both care insufficiently about the inflation stabilization, and the weight assigned by 
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